A Cross-Cultural Examination of National Policies and Representations
of Muslims in China and the Ainu in Japan

In 1968, the Emperor and Prime Minister of Japan attended a centennial celebration of the colonization of Hokkaido island, which, previously known as Ainu Mosir, is a territory indigenous to the Ainu people (Davis, 1990, 18). This gesture is the equivalent of if the American government held a cocktail party at Wounded Knee for victory over the Sioux. The Japanese government again showed its insensitivity towards its minorities by refusing to recognize their existence in 1980, when Japan submitted a report to the Unites States stating, " there are no minorities in Japan to which Article 27 of section II of the International Covenant on Human Rights refers (Davis, 1990, 18)." This resonates with what former General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, Zhao Ziyang, told a meeting on national unity in 1988 that racial discrimination is common "everywhere in the world except for China. (Sautman, 1998-1, 75)" Although China currently recognizes fifty-six nationalities, including the majority Han, at least 400 separate ethnic groups applied to be recognized(1) by the State, of which only forty-one nationalities were listed in the 1953 census, and fifty-six in the 1982 and 1990 censuses (Gladney, 2004, 9). Many are still waiting for recognition.

The current day disregard for and marginalization of minorities in China and Japan can be understood by examining the conditions under which the minority groups were incorporated into the two nations. The politics of nation-forming shaped modern conceptions of nationality and majority, both of which informed popular perceptions of the minorities as well as national policies towards them. Under the threat of foreign encroachment and internal divisions, reformers in Qing Dynasty China and the government of Meiji Japan fomented nationalistic sentiments among the population to mobilize against internal and external threats. 'Traditions' that forged a collective history and a shared sense of values were utilized to produce a popular self-awareness as belonging to a "Yamato minzoku" (nation of the Yamato God) in Japan or a "Han minzu" (Han or "Chinese" nationality). As Gellner articulates, "nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist. (Gellner, 1964, 169)" Consequently, notions of minzoku (nation) and minzu (nationality) were born out of this environment. What was also created is a "majority," specifically those belonging to the "Yamato minzoku" and "Han minzu." To understand current problems between ethnic minority groups and the nation-state, we therefore must revisit the sociopolitical contexts in which the ideas of nation, nationality and majority arise.

This paper is partitioned into three sections. The first will examine concepts of nationality and majority as products of Japan's "assimilationist" approach and China's "multiethnic nation" approach to forming modern nation-states. This comparative analysis will demonstrate that a de-emphasis of internal differences and the construction of myths of shared tradition and descent are common tools employed in the creation of nation-states. The second section aims to understand how a "majority" has been created and how the minorities have been marginalized in the process of forming a nation by examining representations in the media and in art of minority populations - specifically, the Ainu peoples in Japan and the Muslim communities in China. Finally, while the third section will demonstrate that the marginalization of minorities has materialized in concrete national policies towards the Ainu and the Muslims, I will argue that the extent to which they are marginalized differ in Japan and China. While Japan enforces strict assimilationist policies, China allows room for ethnic groups to negotiate with the State to be recognized as distinct cultural or religious communities (Gladney, 2004, 109). Although Barry Sautman argues that racial nationalism in China undercuts state efforts to build state nationalism, I propose that China has factored both racial nationalism and state nationalism to allow for full expression of minority cultures, while keeping national unity.

I chose to study the Muslim community in China because it poses the most difficult challenge for national policy. Islam is based on the belief of a single god, while the government explicitly declares itself atheist. The rapid economic growth in China also brings changes in attitudes and beliefs that may conflict with Islam (Mackerras, 1998, 42). Despite the ideological and cultural differences between the Muslims and the majority Han that often result in social and political disruptions, China has allowed expression of ethnic differences as long as it does not pose a threat to national unity (Gladney, 2004, 256-257 and Mackerras, 1998, 32). In examining how China has handled its most difficult minority issue, perhaps Japan can better respond to international criticisms of its discrimination against the Okinawan, Korean, Chinese, Ainu and Burakumin minority groups. I will discuss representations of and discriminations against the Ainu in this paper to bring to light the problems that other minority communities in Japan might face, although a discussion of the Ainu peoples may not fully be representative of the other groups.

I. Chinese and Japanese Conceptions of Nationality and Majority as Products of the Creation of Nation-states
With the collapse of the 250-year Tokugawa rule and the fear of encroaching Western imperial interests, Meiji rulers felt the urgency to transform individuals who had no prior allegiance to the Imperial family to accept the Emperor as the divine overseer. They believed that popular nationalism was necessary to mobilize human and monetary resources (Fujitani, 1996, 1-25). Similarly, in the Three People's Principles (san min zhu yi), Sun Yat-sen argues that nationalism is a prerequisite for defending against foreign intrusion and overthrowing Manchu rule. Sun writes: "Foreign observers say that the Chinese are like a sheet of loose sand... The unity of the Chinese people has stopped short at the clan and has not extended to the nation..." (Sun, 1924, 2). The project of utmost importance for reformers in China and Japan, therefore, was to create a popularly based national consciousness.
Meiji elites used what Fujitani calls "mnemonic sites" to actively promote an Emperor-centered national consciousness by instituting an official national history and by inventing symbols and rituals. Holidays, education, and the Shinto religion, for example, were used to cultivate a sense of shared values and lifestyle with other Japanese (Fujitani, 1996, 1-25). Center to the process of state-building was the adoption of the idea of a family and filial piety (ko) at the state level. Just as in a family, children ought to obey their parents, Japanese citizens are to obey the Emperor; all that is done in the name of the Emperor justified the sacrifice of individual interests (Kosaku, 1992, 91).

The idea of the family-state (kazoku kokka) informed popular understanding in Japan of what it means to be of Japanese nationality. The family-state implied that members of the nation are related to the Emperor by blood and share a common ancestry. Shinto religion supplemented this idea by teaching that all Japanese descended from a divine origin, the Yamato God. Race, kinship and religion were fused together in forming a collective consciousness and the sense of oneness as a nation. The notion of nationality thus became intertwined with the idea of "purity of blood," because Japanese are by definition related consanguineously to the Emperor. By the end of the Meiji era, "race" (jinshu) and "nation" (minzoku) have become inseparable terms, and "minzoku" eventually came to mean "ethnic-nation. ( Morris-Suzuki, 1998, 95)" Consequently, those of Japanese nationality consider themselves both as citizens and as descendants of the Yamato minzoku (Siddle, 1996, 12-13).

Interestingly, the Chinese term minzu (nationality) entered the Chinese language in the beginning of the 20th century, most likely taken directly from the Japanese term minzoku. After studying abroad, Sun was influenced by the currents of nationalism in Japan. While the notion of a family-state can be excluding to those of "impure" blood such as migrants or colonized peoples, Sun took a more encompassing "multiethnic nation" approach and advocated the 'Five Peoples of China' (wuzu gonghe): the Han, Man (Manchu), Meng (Mongolian), Zang (Tibetan) and Hui (a term that included all Muslims in China), among which the Han is the most numerous. His recognition of these groups in China as distinct nationalities, and the Han nationality as the majority was crucial to unifying China, enabling it to rise above north-south divisions and local allegiances and to produce a counter force against the West and against internal foreigners (Gladney, 2004, 13-16). This notion of a majority Han minzu was later employed by Communist leaders to unify the culturally diverse communities throughout China in which linguistic and cultural differences are often dismissed as regional variations (2).

While the idea of the Yamato minzoku created a national consciousness and solidarity based on a common ancestry with the Emperor, the notion of Han minzu bridged regional differences by inspiring a collective sense of a shared past as descendants from the Yellow Emperor and the dragon (Sautman, 1998, 76). In mobilizing popular support, Japan and China de-emphasized internal differences and constructed myths of shared traditions and descent. Although the invented majority has served well the purposes of fomenting popular nationalism and creating modern nation-states, the making of a majority has great implications for the ethnic minorities that were incorporated into these nation-states.

II. Making Majority, Marginalizing the Minorities
The equation of nation and ethnicity encourages a binary world view that categorizes individuals as either a Japanese or a foreigner (Lie, 2001, 45-48). Given the economic growth in the postwar era that had brought widespread prosperity, and because homogeneity has been assumed by the Japanese to be a major aspect of their society to be valued and preserved. (Lie, 2001, 49). As a result, differences can be perceived to be a danger to the stability of society, and are often met with antagonism. For example, because of the geographical and cultural(3) separation of the Ainu, the very mention of Ainu was taboo in the 1960s (Lie, 2001, 93). The goal of Japan's assimilation policies, therefore, was to absorb such groups that might threaten societal stability by marginalizing them (Weiner, 1994, 213).

Members of the Japanese academia, or what many would call "goyo gakusha" (scholars in the service of the authorities) found several ways to justify these assimilation policies (Utsugi, 1990, 27). Some proposed that the Ainu culture is a disappearing ancient Japanese culture. Others concluded that they are culturally inferior, while a few emphasized the similarities between the Japanese and the Ainu (Utsugi, 1990, 27). The common element in all these studies is the failure to recognize them as a distinct ethnicity by maintaining that they are "primitive," "ancient," and "uncivilized," thereby justifying the absorption of the Ainu into the technologically advanced and "superior" Japanese society (Henshall, 1999, 58). In the realm of art, Japanese painstakingly emphasized the resemblance of the Ainu and animals by depicting an abundance of body hair. These portrayals also have an exotic element, with Ainu women having "deep-set eyes" and living in nature (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1997, 44-45).

Similarly, the Muslim community is exoticized by popular representation in China. In Urumqi, Xinjiang, Uyghur Muslims protested paintings by Han artists at a 1987 exhibition in the Overseas Chinese Hotels that portrayed Uyghur and other Central Asians as excessively sensual - singing, dancing, riding donkeys and balancing watermelons (Gladney, 2004, 54). In another painting, Zhao Yixiaong showed a nude Uyghur female "awakening" in a modern world of airplanes and nuclear installation. These depictions suggest that by renouncing the traditional culture of Islam, with covered women and caravans, the Muslim communities can be modernized (Gladney, 2004, 80).

As Gladney states, "the widespread representation of the minorities as exotic, colorful, and primitive homogenizes the undefined majority as united, mono-ethnic, and modern. (Gladney, 2004, 51-55)" In the process of denigrating the Ainu, Japanese identity and society are reaffirmed, promoting a sense of racial solidarity and superiority of the Yamato minzoku (Weiner, 1994, 25). Similarly, portrayals of Muslims reaffirm Han identity as "superior" and "modern" in encouraging the more "backward" and "primitive" minorities to follow the example of the advanced(4) and civilized Han minzu. Chinese society, like the Japanese, function as what James Hevia refers to as the "sponge and eraser" of foreign cultures. They absorb outsiders into the majority community, while the rest exist only as marginal groups of society (Gladney, 2004, 54).

III. Difference in degree of Marginalization
However, because China maintains that it is a "multinational country(5)," the extent to which minority groups are marginalized in China and Japan differ.
The Ainu are one of the earliest peoples that Japan conquered. During Meiji Japan, for fear of Russian ambitions in the northern regions of Japan and because of interests in the natural resources located in the Ainu-populated land, the government adopted aggressive assimilationist policies (Utsugi, 1990, 20). The Ainu were relocated and transformed into farmers and they were forced to adopt the Japanese way of life, while all aspects of their culture was banned (Lie, 2001, 91). The academic discourse in Japan has always been "What do we do to them?" rather than "What are they? (Tomiyama, 1997, 211)" Beginning in 1877, the Meiji government established special schools for Ainu children that promoted the destruction of traditional culture. Under the 1899 Hokkaido Aborigine Protection Act, the two main pillars of the legislation were to introduce agriculture and to assimilate them into Japanese civilization. Under this law, schools taught Japanese national history and the Japanese language, while the Ainu language was forbidden (Utsugi, 1990, 20).

Even in the postwar years, government negligence and biased academic reports continue to promote discrimination against the Ainu and public ignorance of Ainu conditions. According to a survey taken in 1986, among the 24,381 Ainu in Hokkaido 6.9% are on welfare compared to the 1.1% of all Japanese. While 94.2% of all Japanese high school-aged children are attending school, this is the case only for 78.4% of all Ainu children (Utsugi, 1990, 22). The myth of a homogeneous society further undermines Ainu efforts at bringing their complaints to the public's attention because of the public's failure to recognize the existence of ethnic minorities.
On the contrary, China has allowed room for negotiation with ethnic groups that hope to be recognized as distinct minorities. In 1978, approximately 30,000 Fujianese, even though they no longer practiced Islam, were recognized as members of Hui nationality when they were able to prove descent from foreign Muslims that had settled on the southern coast between the 9th and 14th centuries (Gladney, 2004, 10). As Gladney articulates, ethnic identity is constantly being negotiated between the subjective self-perception by a people and the state's definition for what qualifies as a unique cultural tradition (Gladney, 1997, 159).

Policies towards minority groups also allow minorites to preserve(6) traditional lifestyles and cultures. For example, the 156 ethnic minority autonomous regions can celebrate holidays for traditional festivities (Sautman, 1998-2, 88). Furthermore, exceptions are made such as larger families, affirmative action in obtaining admission into a university, special economic assistance and tax-deductions, and access to political representation on both local and national levels (Gladney, 2004, 56). However, although most autonomous minority regions and districts have minority government leaders, the Communist Party is the sole authority; because most regions are dominated by the Han majority, the state is able to have close scrutiny over these areas (Gladney, 2004,19).

The dynamics between the Chinese state and its ethnic minorities is one of push-and-pull between ethnic identity and national integration. While the state allows for the full expression of ethnic differences, any attempt at secession and any visible threat to national cohesion is suppressed (Mackerras, 1998, 23). Whereas Japan pursues a policy of forceful assimilation of the Ainu peoples, China allows its minorities to practice traditional lifestyles by according them preferential policies as long as the expression of ethnic identity does not threaten national unity.

Conclusion
The histories of modern Japan and China are simultaneously stories of their multiethnic constitution (Gladney, 2004, 84). While the Japanese took an "assimilationist approach" and the Chinese took a "multiethnic approach," both responded to foreign threats and internal divisions by creating traditions and myths of common descent to forge a collective sense of unity. The result was a "majority" that linked ethnicity with nationality. Han minzu became synonymous with "Chinese," while members of the Yamato minzoku referred to those of "pure" Japanese blood. Both majority groups are often portrayed as "modern" and "civilized." Consequently, the Japanese minzoku became a still center into which cultural differences are absorbed and assimilated (Morris-Suzuki, 1998, 158). Although minzu is used for all Chinese nationalities, including the Han, while the term indicates equality among the nationalities, it also implies subordination to the state (Heberer, 1989, 12). In Benedict Anderson's terms, both China and Japan have created an 'imagined community' that consumes and erases differences. Those that survive, however, exist only on the periphery as in the case of the Ainu and Chinese Muslims.

Even though Chinese minority policies creates many, though different, problems than those that the minorities in Japan face, the Chinese model demonstrates the possibility of allowing different cultural expressions among the ethnic groups without sacrificing national unity and stability. While Japan enforces strict assimilationist policies, China allows room for ethnic groups to negotiate with the State to be recognized as distinct cultural or religious communities (Gladney, 2004, 109). In light of persisting international protest and Ainu activism(7), perhaps in referring to how China has dealt with its fifty-five minorities, Japan can better respond to the demands of its minority populations.

China maneuvers between promoting ethnic identity and keeping national unity, a balancing act between racial nationalism, based on the emphasis of a common ancestry of China's different ethnic groups, and state nationalism, which is founded on equality(8) among its groups. China's policy towards its minorities can be summed up as "political integration but cultural diversification (Hsieh, 1987, 5)." While Sautman argues that racial nationalism undercuts state efforts to build Chinese state nationalism, I propose that China has used a two-pronged approach of both racial nationalism and state nationalism to tackle two seemingly contradictory goals of national unity and ethnic recognition.

Notes:

(1) The qualifications for a nationality was based on the Soviet Union's "four commons" - " a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up." (Gladney, 2004, 9).

(2) In 1990, the state-recognized majority consists of 91 percent of the population that included culturally and ethnically diverse groups that are mutually linguistically unintelligible such as Mandarin, Wu, Yue, Xiang, Hakka, Gan, Southern Min, and Northern Min. Even within these groups there are linguistic and cultural diversity. (Gladney, 2004, 7)

(3) While mainstream Japanese deified plants and mainly farmed, the Ainu revered the bear and subsisted on hunting and gathering (Emiko, 45).

(4) Article 122 of the PRC constitution decrees that "the state gives financial, material and technical assistance to the minority nationalities to accelerate their economic and cultural development. (Sautman, 1998-1, 87) "

(5) On a Chinese New Year CCTV television program in 1991, the first program began with the host announcing: "China is a multinational country, fifty-six different nationalities, like fifty-six different flowers. The many nationalities wish to extend to all of you a Happy New Year. " Colorfully dressed minority groups including the Tibetans, Mongols and Hui among others present minority gifts to a "Han" audience dressed in Western-style attire while singing songs in their native language. (Gladney, 2004, 51-55)

(6) Article 53 of the PRC constitution says that "All national minorities shall have freedom to develop their dialects and languages, to preserve or reform their traditions, customs, and religious beliefs. The People's Government shall assist the masses of the people of all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural, and educational construction work. (Moseley, Appendix C)

(7) See Utsugi, 23-26

(8) Article 50 of the PRC constitution says that "All nationalities within the boundaries of the People's Republic of China are equal. They shall establish unity and mutual aid among themselves, and shall oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the People's Republic of China will become a big fraternal and cooperative family composed of all nationalities. Great Nation chauvinism will be opposed. Acts involving discrimination, oppression, and splitting of the unity of the various nationalities should be prohibited. (Moseley, Appendix C)

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